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STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS: DETERMINING A
DUTY TO DISCLOSE AMONG INDUSTRY COMPETITORS
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon TechnologiesAG,
318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
HowardGoldfarb*
Appellant, a designer of computer memory technologies,' filed a patent
application for a new computer memory architecture known as Rambus
DRAM (RDRAM). 2 Appellant then joined3 the JEDEC Solid State
Technology Association (JEDEC)4 and participated in developing
industry-wide standards for semiconductor technologies. 5 During
Appellant's membership, JEDEC adopted a standard for synchronous
dynamic random access memory (SDRAM).6 Following Appellant's
withdrawal from JEDEC,7 JEDEC began to formulate, and eventually
* J.D. expected 2005, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. Winner of the Journal

of Technology Law & Policy Summer 2003 Open Writing Competition. The author wishes to thank
his family and friends for all of their continuing support and encouragement.
1. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Appellant
is in the business of designing, developing, licensing, and marketing high-speed computer chip
connection technology. Id. Appellant does not produce or manufacture these technologies, and
instead relies on the licensing of these patents for revenue. Id.
2. Id. at 1086. In 1991, Appellant filed U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 07/510,898 ('898
application) with claims directed to a memory technology known as dynamic random access
memory (DRAM). Id. at 1084. Appellant's '898 application has spawned several applications
utilizing the basic DRAM technology, of which at least thirty-one applications have been issued
by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and many of these patents claim various aspects
of a memory technology known as Rambus DRAM (RDRAM). Id.
3. Id.at 1085. Appellant first attended JEDEC Solid State Technology Association (JEDEC)
meetings as a guest in December 1991, but shortly thereafter officially joined JEDEC in February
1992. Id. Guests, as nonmembers, must receive an invitation to attend JEDEC meetings. Id.
4. Id. JEDEC, formerly the Joint Electron Devices Engineering Council, is now known as
the JEDEC Solid State Technology Association. Id. at 1085 n. 1. JEDEC is a standard-setting body
affiliated with the Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA), which was formerly known as the
Electronic Industries Association during Appellant's association with JEDEC. Id. at 1085.
5. Id. JEDEC encourages the adoption of patent free technology standards for use by fellow
JEDEC members, and thus both JEDEC and EIA have written policies expressing these views. Id.
6. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1085. Appellant was a member ofJEDEC Committee 42.3 (JC42.3), which was responsible for drafting standards for random access memory (RAM), a common
computer component. Id. During Appellant's membership, JC-42.3 adopted a standard for
synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), which synchronizes itself with the central
processing unit's (CPU's) clock speed and thereby increases the speed at which a CPU can read or
write memory. Id.
7. Id. Appellant officially withdrew from JEDEC in June 1996. Id.
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adopted, a standard for double data rate-SDRAM (DDR-SDRAM), the
successor to SDRAM.8
Appellant alleged that both SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM standards
incorporated aspects of patented RDRAM technology,9 and brought suit
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging
patent infringement against Appellee, a JEDEC member and manufacturer
of semiconductor memory devices.' Appellee counterclaimed for fraud,
alleging Appellant failed to disclose JEDEC required patents and patent
applications informing JEDEC members that the adopted standards were
patented technology."' The district court found that Appellant committed
fraud during SDRAM standardization, but did not commit fraud during
DDR-SDRAM standardization." Upon appeal by both parties, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, by jurisdiction granted under
federal statute, 3 reversed in part and HELD that Appellant did not breach
a duty to disclose existing patents and pending patent applications to
JEDEC members, and thus did not engage in fraudulent behavior
concerning either memory standardization. 4

8. Id. JEDEC began work on a double data rate-SDRAM (DDR-SDRAM) standard in
December 1996, and finally adopted and published a DDR-SDRAM standard in 2000. Id. DDRSDRAM, as compared to SDRAM, doubles the transfer rate between the CPU and memory device.
Id.
9. Id. at 1085-86. In September 1993, Appellant disclosed its first issued RDRAM patent,
which spawned four patent applications concerning improvements to RDRAM technology, the first
of which was issued in 1999. Id. Appellant alleged that the patent amendments issued during this
time improved on the original RDRAM technology, and it is these improvements that have
technology claims against the SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM standards. See id.
10. Id. at 1086. Appellant alleged fifty-seven infringement claims stemming from the four
disputed patents: U.S. Patent Nos. 5,954,804 ('804 patent), 5,953,263 ('263 patent), 6,034,918
('918 patent), and 6,032,214 ('214 patent). Id. at 1085-86. Appellee is a manufacturer of
semiconductor memory devices that utilize both SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM technology. Id. at
1086.
11. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1086.
12. Id. Both allegations of fraud during standardization were sent to ajury, upon which the
jury found that Appellant committed fraud during both SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM
standardization. Id. However, Appellant moved for a directed verdict on DDR-SDRAM, which the
district court granted. Id.
13. The federal statute reads in pertinent part:
[The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction] ... of
an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States... if the jurisdiction
of that court was based, in whole or in part, . .. [on patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights, mask works, designs, trademarks, and unfair competition].
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000).
14. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1105.

CASE COMMENT

Traditionally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews
issues not within its exclusive jurisdiction under the applicable state law.' 5
Under Virginia law, a party must demonstrate the existence of fraud by
clear and convincing evidence defined as: (1) a false representation, (2) of
a material fact, (3) made intentionally and knowingly, (4) with the intent
to mislead, (5) with reasonable reliance by the misled party, and (6)
resulting in damages to the misled party.' 6 Within the subject of fraud,
Virginia has recognized a cause of action for constructive fraud resulting
from another's silence in the presence of a duty to disclose. 7
Before finding an omission in the face of a duty to disclose, courts must
first ascertain the existence and character of the duty.' 8 Examining relevant
tort law reveals the existence of a duty to disclose may well be a legal
question with factual underpinnings. 9 According to the Restatement,
"whether there is a duty to the other to disclose the fact in question is
always a matter for the determination of the court. '2' However, some
states treat the existence of a disclosure duty as a question of law, and the
breach of that duty as a factual determination.2 ' Virginia has not expressed
whether the existence of a duty to disclose is a question of law or fact, but
two cases provide limited insight.22
In Hiett v. BarcroftBeach, Inc.,23 the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,
Virginia examined whether a duty to speak was an issue for the factfinders or a court.24 The plaintiff in Hiett,a triathlon competitor who broke
his neck during the event, brought suit to allow submission of the issue of
constructive fraud to the jury.25 The plaintiff alleged that the competition
form he signed under time constraints contained a waiver, which the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.at 1087.
Id. at 1096.
Signet Bank, 193 F.3d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1999).
Bank of Montreal v..
Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1096.
Id. at 1087 n.3.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. m (Main Vol., 1976).
Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1087 n.3.
Id. at 1087.
Hiett v. Barcroft Beach, Inc., 22 Va. Cir. 240, 242 (Va. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 242.
Hiett v. Barcroft Beach, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 315, 316 (Va. Cir. 1989).
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sponsor knew existed and pressured the plaintiff into signing.26 The
defendant countered that the sponsor had no duty to verbally disclose the
waiver.27
The Hiett court held that constructive fraud was an issue for the jury as
a question of fact.2" The Hiett court reasoned that the social setting of the
signing, as opposed to a business setting that would have required a
heightened scrutiny of the contract language, made the question of duty
more suitable for a jury's resolution.2 9 The Hiett court further articulated
that the plaintiff s allegation that he was unaware he was signing a contract
was also a key30conflict that was more properly a question for the jury's
determination.
Although business settings require a heightened awareness between
parties, a Virginia case examined an arm's length business transaction for
a duty to disclose.3 ' In Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank,32 the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recognized that the duty to disclose and
the reasonableness of reliance in arm's length transactions are questions
to be decided by the jury in light of various factors. 3 The plaintiff in Bank
of Montreal alleged that the defendant engaged in fraudulent behavior by
encouraging the plaintiff to approve a loan to a fraudulent company, while
the defendant rejected a loan authorization to the same company under the
suspicion of a sham transaction. 34 The defendant claimed that it was both
unaware that the loan recipient was a fraudulent 3company, and was under
no duty to make any disclosures to the plaintiff. 1
The Bank of Montreal Court found sufficient evidence that the
defendant had a duty to disclose its loan rejection. 36 Although both parties
were industry competitors and were under no contractual obligation to
disclose, the Bank ofMontrealCourt reasoned that ajury could have found
that the defendant had superior knowledge with respect to the loan
rejection.37 In addition, the Bank ofMontreal Court further articulated that

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Hiett, 22 Va. Cir. at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bank of Montreal v. Signet Bank, 193 F.3d 818, 829 (4th Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 825-26.
Id. at 828.
Bank ofMontreal, 193 F.3d at 829.
Id.

CASE COMMAENT

the jury could have found that the plaintiff relied to its detriment on the
false assumption of the defendant's lack of superior knowledge."
Finding a disclosure duty among industry competitors usually requires
a contractual arrangement or fiduciary duty. However, the unrestricted
disclosure of information between competitors in standard-setting
organizations, even under contractual obligation, unearths serious antitrust
concerns.4° The planned meeting of established competitors to decide
industry-wide practices can substantially raise barriers to entry and
occasionally result in price fixing concerns.4 Yet standard-setting
organizations usually avoid the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC's)
that consensus standards are
intrusion because the government
42 recognizes
essential to the U.S. economy.
This laissez-faire approach to standard-setting is at odds with the
government's stringent regulation of patent law, primarily because a patent
can confer a legal monopoly over a technology.43 Additionally, a new
antitrust threat has arisen concerning standard-setting organizations;
namely, the legal resolution for a falsely assumed, patent-free standard that
when adopted may result in the conferring of an unregulated monopoly to
the patent holder.44 One aspect of this issue surrounds the relationship
between each member of an open standards committee, considering their
positions as industry competitors, and the determination of whether
regulated colluders owe a duty of disclosure to each other.45
The instant court, considering that neither party contested the district
court's finding that the existence of a disclosure duty was a factual
determination, analyzed the existence of a duty to disclose between
JEDEC members as purely a question of fact." In its analysis, the instant
38. Id.
39. Cohen v. Mastie, 31 Va. Cir. 96, 99 (Va. Cir. 1993); see also Devansky v. Dryvit Sys.,
Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 359, 361 (Va. Cir. 2000).
40. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs., 318 F.3d 1081, 1096 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The instant
court recognized that, even under contractual obligations, competitors have a duty to the
marketplace not to collude with fellow industry competitors. See id. Therefore, even if Appellant
was under a contractual obligation to disclose the company's future intentions regarding the
issuance of patent applications, antitrust law would regard this required disclosure as discouraged
collusion. See id. at 1102.
41. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting
Organizations,90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002).
42. See id. at 1896-98.
43. See Daniel J. Gifford,Antitrust 'sTroubledRelationswith IntellectualProperty,87 MINN.
L. REv. 1695, 1705-08 (2003).
44. Lemley, supra note 41, at 1929.
45. See Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1096-1103.
46. Id. at 1087 n.3.
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court was the first tribunal to verify the existence of a duty to disclose
within a standard-setting organization as a pure matter of fact. 7 Yet the
instant court expressed strong reservations about this determination,48 and
cited several examples of tort law jurisprudence where the existence of a
disclosure duty may well be a mixed question of law and fact.49
Before it could determine whether the Appellant breached a duty to
disclose, the instant court first ascertained what duty the Appellant owed
JEDEC.5 ° This analysis required an interpretation, similar to the jury's
responsibility at the district court trial, of the written EIA/JEDEC patent
policy." After reviewing the policy, the instant court concluded that
JEDEC expressly discouraged the adoption of patented standards, unless
the committee knew the patented technical information and the patentee
agreed to a reasonable license fee. 2 But beyond this discouragement, the
instant court found the written patent policy void of any direct disclosure
duty on its members."
Nevertheless, because JEDEC members treated the language of the
written policy as imposing a duty to disclose certain patents, the instant4
court treated the policy language as imposing a form of a disclosure duty.
Additionally, although the JEDEC policy does not use the language
"related to," the parties agreed that the JEDEC policy language required
disclosure of patents "related to" the standardization work of the
committee." However, both parties disagreed over the interpretation of the
"related to" language.56

47. See id.
48. Id. at 1087 nn.2-3. The instant court's reference to "limited insight," as well as stating
several sources of tort law that may contradict the district court's determination, suggest that the
instant court has reservations concerning the application of a purely factual determination of an
existence of a disclosure duty. Id.
49. Id.
50. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1096.
51. Id. at 1087. Three manuals, EP-3-F, EP-7-A, and JEP 21-1, contain JEDEC's patent
disclosure policy. Id. at 1096. However, only Appendix E (Legal Guidelines Summary) was ever
presented to committee members at JEDEC meetings. Id. at 1096-98. Appendix E read, in relevant
part, as follows: "Standards that call for the use of a patented item or process may not be considered
by a JEDEC committee unless all of the relevant technical information covered by the patent or
pending patent is known to the committee, subcommittee, or working group." Id at 1097.
52. Id. at 1101-02.
53. Id. at 1098.
54. Id. at 1098-99.
55. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1098-99.
56. Id.

2003]
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Appellant contended that the "related to" language refers only to
patents that read on or cover the technology standard." Appellee claimed
disclosure of patent applications
that the policy language also covers the
"related to" the committee's work.5" The instant court held that a
reasonable expectation is required on behalf of the patent holder that a
license is needed to implement a standard,59 because to hold otherwise
would render the JEDEC disclosure duty unbounded to any patent or
application having a vague relationship to the standard.6" The instant court
stressed that the disclosure duty cannot require JEDEC members to reveal
intentions for future patent applications, because antitrust laws discourage
direct competitors from discussing market-driving innovations.6"
After limiting JEDEC's disclosure rule to the clear, written policy, the
instant court then examined the claims that Appellant breached a duty to
disclose patents that "related to" both the SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM
standards.62 Concerning SDRAM, the instant court, reasoning that a
license for Appellant's claimed technology was not required to practice the
adopted SDRAM standard, found that Appellant's claimed technology did
not fall within the JEDEC disclosure duty.6 3 Concerning DDR-SDRAM,
the instant court articulated in a more concise ruling that the Appellant did
not breach a duty to disclose "related to" patents, primarily because the
DDR-SDRAM standard was adopted after the Appellant withdrew from
JEDEC.64
The instant court's finding that Appellant's duty was limited by the
EIA/JEDEC written policy confirms that antitrust concerns were
paramount in determining a disclosure duty.65 By scrutinizing the JEDEC
policy as a matter of fact, the instant court had a responsibility to review

57. Id. at 1099. In September 1993, Appellant disclosed the '703 patent to JEDEC. Id.
Appellee contended that the '703 patent did not "relate to" the SDRAM standard, but several other
of Appellant's undisclosed patents did "relate to" the SDRAM standard. Id. However, the instant
court found the descriptions within the '703 disclosed patent identical to the descriptions within
Appellant's undisclosed patents and applications. Id. This distinction rendered the key factor in
determining whether a patent is "related to" a standard patent's specific claims. Rambus, Inc., 318
F.3d at 1099.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1101. The instant court found this subjective component irreconcilable with its
mandated clear, written patent policy. See id.
60. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1101.
61. Id. at 1102.
62. Id. at 1102-03.
63. Id. at 1105.
64. Id.
65. See Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1096 n.7.
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all circumstantial evidence, rather than only the written policy.66 However,
an all-encompassing review may have revealed a broader disclosure duty,
and yielded a judgment altering breach of that duty.6 7 In light of antitrust
concerns surrounding a broad disclosure duty among industry competitors,
68
the instant court analyzed only the defined, written patent policy.
It is unclear why, given the instant court's apprehension over
construing the disclosure duty as merely a factual question,69 JEDEC's
duty to disclbse policy was not analyzed as at least a partial question of
law. The instant court even questioned the district court's use of only Hiett
and Bank of Montreal in their determination.7" In particular, the instant
court opined that the Bank of MontrealCourt did not cite a single case that
expressly stated that the existence of a duty to disclose was a factual
determination. 7
Although ajudgment finding a narrow disclosure duty could have been
rendered as a matter of law, the instant court was arguably attempting to
isolate the instant case from impacting future precedent.72 By rendering a
narrow disclosure duty, the instant court could have given a definitive
roadmap to confront fraudulent behavior in standard-setting organizations.
In separating the Appellant through circumstantial evidence,73 the instant
court delayed making a clear rule balancing unwritten duties between
competitors
and their resulting impact on price fixing and barriers to
74
entry.

66. See id. at 1107 (Prost, J, dissenting).
67. See id. (Prost, J., dissenting). Judge Prost's dissent suggests that if all circumstantial
evidence were taken into account, Appellant's duty to disclose to JEDEC would have been broader
and included pending patent applications. See id. (Prost, J., dissenting). This analysis logically
would result in finding Appellant's behavior fraudulent See id. (Prost, J., dissenting).
68. See id. at 1101-02.
69. See id. at 1087 nn.2-3.
70. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1087 n.2.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1098-1102. In analyzing the duty to disclose as a pure matter of fact, whereby
relevant facts can be considered to tailor the opinion, and possibly distinguish Appellant's case
from future concerns, the instant court abandoned setting a clear, definitive rule for determining
a duty to disclose. See id.
73. Id. at 1087. In construing the written EIA/JEDEC policy, the instant court's duty
determination will only impact JEDEC members during Appellant's membership period. Id.
74. Id. at 1096 n.7. The instant court only alludes to the potential antitrust concerns, and does
not offer guidance to standard-setting bodies to conform to antitrust pitfalls. Id.
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Nevertheless, Appellant's business model is considerably unique," and
its influential position within the memory industry renders the instant court
reasonable in fashioning an exclusive ruling.76 On its face, Appellant's
business model as strictly a technology licenser is distinct to JEDEC,
where members are typically also device manufacturers." By
distinguishing Appellant's unique circumstances, the instant court's ruling
may offer an opportunity to continue the governments' hands-off approach
to standard-setting organizations,78 while affording Appellant a sufficient
remedy.
Beyond the inability to define a legal roadmap, the instant court is
equally unhelpful in defining suitable disclosure policies. Declaring a
written policy requiring the disclosure of potential patent applications in
conflict with antitrust law, the instant court forced organizations like
JEDEC to examine their disclosure policies and more clearly define each
member's duty to another.79 In addition, a policy requiring the disclosure
of patent applications is equally too vague a proposition, and the instant
court clearly articulated their dislike for this unbounded policy.80 The
proper boundaries of an enforceable disclosure policy seem ambiguous,
but the instant court's ruling suggests that future conflicts should be
handled within the standards committee.8

75. See Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1084. Appellant does not manufacture devices like other
JEDEC members, and instead relies solely on the licensing of patented technology. Id. However,
most technology standard-setting bodies utilize a cross-licensing policy whereby each member
"cherry picks" off another member's technology for a reasonable fee and allows the technology's
use in the member's devices. See Lemley, supra note 41, at 1929. Appellant's business model
cannot partake in this quid pro quo agreement, and thus seeks to charge a license fee that may well
be higher than "reasonable." See generally id.
76. See Heidi Monson, Millenium Memory-Rambus or DDR SDRAM (1999), availableat
http://www.sysopt.com/articles/memory/ (last visited Nov. 9,2003). SDRAM has become the most
widely adopted memory standard for personal computers, and Appellant claims aspects of both
SDRAM and DDR-SDRAM, the successor to SDRAM, in its RDRAM patented technology.
Consequently, Appellant is extremely influential in the computer memory industry.
77. See Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1084-85.
78. Compare Lemley, supra note 41, at 1896-98, with Gifford, supranote 43, at 1705-08.
79. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1101-02.
80. Id. at 1101.
81. See id. at 1102. The instant court stressed that JEDEC had several options in originally
drafting patent policies, but construing the policies in their current, written form forced the instant
court's ruling. See id. The citing of alternative measures serves to give JEDEC a quasi-roadmap to
altertheir policies for the future. See id.However, other comments appearing throughout the instant
court's opinion serve to dramatically limit JEDEC's policy drafting options. See id. Nevertheless,
this particular comment seems to personally direct the power to change policy with the JEDEC
policy drafters. See Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1102.
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The instant court's ruling seems to fashion ajust ruling from misguided
principles, with the sole purpose of maintaining the status quo.82 However,
a recent FTC complaint against Appellant for allegedly monopolizing the
memory market will allow this opinion to receive scrutiny sooner rather
than later.83 Considering the instant court's findings," it seems likely that
Appellant will find an equally favorable ruling. Otherwise, the FTC would
find the Appellant securing an illegal monopoly through nonfraudulent
means, a decidedly novel idea. 5
The evolving landscape of technology and patent law within standardsetting organizations demands a definitive rule concerning patent
disclosure duties. As standard-setting organizations begin to reexamine
their disclosure policies, new technology designers will most likely emerge
utilizing Appellant's successful business model.86 To escape governmental
intrusion, standard-setting organizations will need to create fair, welldefined policies that include these new entities during standardization.87

82. See id. at 1106-07.
83. Lemley, supra note 41, at 1929.
84. Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1084.
85. Compare id. at 1084-85, with In re Rambus, Inc., No. 9302 (F.T.C. June 19, 2002)
(finding Appellant's nondisclosure of patents not fraudulent in Rambus, Inc., and potentially
finding Appellant guilty of violating the Sherman Act through the same nondisclosure).
86. See Rambus, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1085.
87. Seeid. at 1101.

